United States And NATO

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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An Analysis of the NATO Treaty—*pg 2*



NATO—A Working Alliance For Peace —*pg 4*

Based on Cooperation

Analysis of the NATO Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty consists of a framework for broadly based cooperation between the signatory countries. It is not solely a military alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur; it permits continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic and other nonmilitary fields.

The signatory countries undertake, in conformity with the terms of the United Nations Charter, to preserve peace and international security and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They further undertake to eliminate possible conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic collaboration between their countries.

The treaty has thus a double aspect; it affirms the importance of economic and social progress and, at the same time, the adoption of a policy of security, based on the inherent right of collective self-defense. The treaty is an agreement between certain countries for their collective self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. It consists of a preamble and fourteen articles.

The preamble outlines the main features of the treaty: it is a treaty of alliance within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, for the defense of a way of life, not only by means of essential military measures but also by cooperation in political, economic, social and cultural fields.

Article 1 defines the basic principles to be followed by member countries in conducting their international relations in order to avoid endangering peace and world security.

Article 2 defines the aims to be followed by member countries in their international relationships, and their resulting obligations.

Article 3 deals with the means of maintaining and increasing the individual and collective capacity of NATO member countries to resist an armed attack. Member countries of NATO are under an obligation to develop their individual capacities to resist and to act jointly through the medium of mutual assistance.



Article 4 envisages a threat to one of the member countries of NATO. Member countries will consult together if the territorial integrity or political independence of one of them is endangered. In practice, this consultation takes place within the framework of the North Atlantic Council meetings.

Article 5 is the most important article of the treaty. It states: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. . . ."

This article goes on to define the obligations of countries in the event of armed attack. These consist in taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties to the treaty, such action, including the use of armed force, as is deemed necessary by each party.

CONTROL CENTER—Plotters at work before data display consoles at a NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) Operational Control Center in Denmark. NADGE is the largest electronic defense project ever undertaken, extending from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern frontier of Turkey.

NATO Photo

Each country is therefore free to take whatever action it considers appropriate.

Joint action is justified by the exercise of the natural right of self-defense, individual or collective, as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The exercise of this right in no way affects the primary competence of the Security Council in matters relating to the maintenance and restoration of peace. The final provisions of Article 5 stipulate that the measures so taken shall be reported to the Security Council and shall be terminated when that body has taken necessary measures.

Article 6 defines the area in which the provisions of Article 5 are applicable. This area covers the territories of all member countries in Europe and North America, the territory of Turkey in Asia Minor, the islands under the jurisdiction of any member in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer and any allied forces, vessels or aircraft in that area or in the Mediterranean.

The definition of the military area in which the treaty is applicable in no way implies that political events occurring outside it cannot be the subject of consultations within the council, for it is the overall international situation which is liable to affect the preservation of peace and security in the area in question, and it is to consideration of this situation that the council must, and indeed does, devote its attention as a matter of course.

Article 9 provides for the creation of bodies to implement the provisions of the treaty. It is these bodies which constitute the "organization" as such within the strict meaning of the North Atlantic Treaty. It commits its parties in particular to establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented". This council "shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time". For the rest it is left to the council to "set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary" and this is the basis on which the organization has gradually been built up.

Articles 12 and 13 deal with possibilities of revision and denunciation of the treaty. After 10 years the parties may agree to review the treaty (Article 12). After it has been in force for 20 years, any party may withdraw from the alliance one year after it has given notice of denunciation. (Article 13). The treaty itself is of indefinite duration.

Defensive Alliance

NATO: An Alliance for Peace

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is essentially and above all else a defensive alliance. Secondly, NATO is an intergovernmental organization; it is not supranational. Thirdly, in peacetime, national forces receive orders only from national authorities, although they hold exercises together. The military task of NATO in peacetime is to draw up joint defense plans, to set up necessary infrastructure, and to arrange for joint training in order to provide for the best possible use of NATO forces without delay in the event of war. This military preparedness is aimed above all at preventing war. On the political side, the alliance provides not only for the direction of the military, but for consultation on all political problems of relevance to its members or to the alliance as a whole.

Since 1967 the alliance has been taking positive steps, notably initiatives in the field of mutual and balanced force reductions, to ease tensions between East and West, and NATO's basic policy is based on the twin principles of defense and détente. The aim of all member countries is "to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees".

Since 1969 the alliance has also started work aimed at promoting solutions to some of the major environmental problems.

Defence Policy

The alliance's policy has always been to maintain adequate forces, but no more, necessary for preserving a stable situation of balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is noteworthy that in recent years the Soviet Union has achieved a strategic nuclear capability comparable to that of the West, while in the field of conventional armaments the Soviet naval forces in particular are increasing very markedly—yet there has been no corresponding increase in NATO forces.

Since 1967 the overall strategy of the NATO alliance has been changed from one of "massive nuclear retaliation" to one of "flexibility in response". NATO's aim is to be able to counter aggression at any level by an appropriate choice of response: and the potential enemy is not to know which response would be selected. Thus for example, although NATO does not maintain sufficient conventional forces to fight an all-out conventional war for more than a short period, NATO does have enough of such forces to provide the alliance with a credible conventional option. Indeed, in a situation of nuclear sufficiency on both sides, the very credibility of the ultimate nuclear deterrent depends on our having adequate conventional forces which could be used to counter a relatively minor attack, or which could be committed in the early stages even of a major aggression, if the alliance so decided.

A major study of the problems of alliance defense in the 1970s was commissioned in 1970 and the report, which has come to be known as the "AD 70 Report", was approved by Ministers at their meeting in December that year. Ministers recognized and hoped that the 1970s might develop into an era for successful negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, but at the same time they stressed that the alliance could not ignore some disturbing features in the international scene,

U.S. Navy Photo

OPERATION—Heavy equipment comes ashore from a utility landing craft during a NATO amphibious operation. Men and ships from the U.S. and The Netherlands took part in the exercise.

NATO Photo

General view of the North Atlantic Council meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

in particular the continuing build-up of Warsaw Pact forces. The AD 70 Report identified a number of critical areas in which NATO's conventional forces need to be progressively and systematically improved over the course of the present decade. Planning is now well advanced to launch the necessary action programs to this end. A message by President Nixon addressed to the same Ministerial meeting confirmed that the United States, given a similar approach by its allies, would maintain and improve its forces in Europe, and this affirmation was repeated by the United States in December 1971 and December 1972.

In parallel with the AD 70 Study a group of 10 NATO European countries, which has come to be called the Eurogroup, decided upon certain major improvements in the defense field which they could begin to make at once and which could serve as a first major step in the direction indicated by the AD 70 Study. This European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP), costing roughly a billion dollars over some five years, was adopted at the same Ministerial meeting.

When reviewing the EDIP in December 1971, the Defense Ministers of the countries concerned noted the satisfactory implementation of the programs adopted in 1970 and announced a further planned increase in European defense spending for 1972 of over 1 billion dollars.

These measures, as well as United States plans to improve substantially its conventional forces in Europe, were welcomed by the Defense Planning Committee when it met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on December 8, 1971, as was likewise the enhanced United States contribution to NATO's strategic deterrent which will result from the deployment of the Poseidon weapon system.

At the close of 1972 the Eurogroup Ministers stated that the momentum of the EDIP will be maintained in 1973, with the planned defense budgets of member countries at least 1.5 billion dollars higher than in 1972.

At the same period, the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment project (NADGE) was virtually completed, thus giving the European NATO allies for the first time a fully integrated semi-automatic air defense stretching from Northern Norway to the Eastern confines of Turkey.

Political Consultation

Although political consultation had always taken place from the earliest days of the alliance, it was given a new impetus when the Report of Three Foreign Ministers on Nonmilitary Cooperation within the alliance was adopted in 1956. This report called for consultation on all matters of interest to the alliance

during the formative stage of government decision making. This consultation has developed over the years to a high degree. The highest authority in the alliance, which provides the forum for such consultation, is the North Atlantic Council, which meets twice a year at Ministerial level and at least once a week at the level of the Permanent Representatives. Consultation also takes place through the political and other committees and in working groups. The council and its committees permit constant multilateral consultation (equivalent to 105 bilateral exchanges each time the council meets) and this constitutes a new and unique type of machinery for consultation—a kind of diplomatic workshop. Consultations have taken place on such subjects as the Partial Test Ban Treaty, Treaties on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control on the Seabed—all Western initiatives in the disarmament field. The United States Government has, through the NATO Council, been consulting its allies in detail at each stage of the talks with the Soviet Union on Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT).

Force Reductions

Following the Harmel Report in 1967 and the Reykjavik Declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions in 1968, the alliance has continued to work for detente as well as defense and although the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in 1968 was a serious set-back, the alliance maintained its studies and initiatives on this subject. The Ministers repeated the invitation in December 1969, while a further declaration following the Rome Ministerial Council Meeting in May 1970, invited "interested states to hold exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, with special reference to the central region". After the Rome meeting, an approach was made through diplomatic channels to the U.S.S.R. and other Warsaw Pact and neutral countries. It was not, however, until the first part of 1971 that Soviet statesmen began to express interest in holding such discussions. On October 6, 1971, after a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers, Permanent Representatives and high officials in Brussels, the appointment was announced of Manlio Brosio, the former Secretary General of NATO, to conduct explora-

Joseph Luns
Secretary General of NATO

tory talks with the Soviet Union and other interested governments. To this initiative the U.S.S.R. made no response.

During May 1972, a number of East-West developments opened the way for subsequent moves towards exploratory Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks. When the NATO Ministers met in Bonn they agreed on two points with a special bearing on MBFR: first, to enter multilateral conversations concerned with a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and second, that exploratory talks on MBFR should begin as soon as practicable either before or in parallel with multilateral preparatory talks on CSCE.

By the autumn, the U.S.S.R. was responding favorably to the call for some degree of parallelism between the two sets of exploratory talks and this development enabled the western states concerned with MBFR to make a firm proposal to five Warsaw Pact countries in November.

Formal replies to the allied proposal were made in mid-January and, after a further exchange of notes, the first meeting was held on January 31, 1973, in Vienna.

Contacts and Negotiations

Meeting in Washington in April 1969, to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, the NATO allies had decided to explore with the U.S.S.R. and its allies in Eastern Europe which issues might best lend themselves to fruitful negotiations and early resolution.

The period that followed (1969-1972) saw a remarkable intensification of East-West contacts and the conclusion of several important negotiations. They included the treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S.S.R. and between the Federal Republic and Poland; the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin; the signing of the interim agreement between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT) and the opening of the second SALT talks in November 1972; President Nixon's visits during 1972 to Peking and Moscow; the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic; the Four-Power declaration to the effect that the admission to the U.N. of the two states in Germany will not affect their rights and responsibilities under quadripartite agreements.

Soviet assent to the Berlin agreement enabled the allied countries to accept the invitation of the Finnish Government to participate in multilateral preliminary talks intending to lead to a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Conversations began in Helsinki on November 22, 1972.

Problems of Environment

Following an initiative by President Nixon in 1969, the NATO Council established a special committee to deal

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RADAR—Italian soldiers guard a new long distance radar installation in Italy. The radar automatically fixes the coordinates of aircraft flying within a vast perimeter, despite natural or artificial interference.

NATO Photo

with this question, known as the Committee on the Challanges of Modern Society (CCMS). The aim is to improve intergovernmental collaboration on environmental and social problems and to stimulate action. Several projects were energetically launched covering such questions as air, river and sea pollution, road accident prevention, disaster assistance, etc. The committee works through a system of "pilot" studies, one or more countries accepting special responsibility for organizing the study of a particular problem. Having provided its members with security for more than 20 years, it was logical for the alliance to begin to consider the quality of life, in conformity with Article 2 of the treaty, by which the allies are pledged to promote "conditions of stability and well-being". In this way, NATO's considerable experience in obtaining practical results from the exchange of technological, scientific and economic information is now being applied also to environmental problems, while being careful to avoid duplicating work done by other bodies in this field.

Structure and Elements

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The highest authority of the alliance is the North Atlantic Council, composed of representatives of the 15 member countries. The Council meets at the level of Ministers or Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors). Ministerial meetings, attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance or Economic Affairs according to the agenda, are held at least twice a year, at a member capital in the spring and at NATO's Brussels headquarters in the winter. In permanent session, at the level of the Ambassadors, the Council meets at least once a week—often more frequently—thus ensuring continuous allied consultation. When necessary the Council can meet at very short notice.

The Secretary General of NATO is chairman of the Council at whatever level it may meet. Annually, the Foreign Minister of a member state is nominated honorary President of the Council, following the English alphabetical order of countries.

NATO being an organization of sovereign states equal in status, all decisions are expressions of the collective will of member governments, taken not by majority vote but by common consent. The Council is a forum for wide consultation and exchange of views between governments on major issues, including political, military, economic and many other subjects.

Military policy is discussed in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), composed of the fourteen member countries

Scottish airborne soldiers disembark during a large NATO operation in the Federal Republic of Germany.

taking part in NATO's Integrated Defence System. France, having withdrawn from the integrated military organization in 1966, does not attend these meetings. Whether at Ministerial or Permanent Representative level, the DPC meets under the chairmanship of the Secretary General.

Representatives and Delegations

The 15 Permanent Representatives of the member countries are supported by national delegations located at NATO Headquarters. The delegations are composed of officials qualified to represent their countries on the various committees. Before meetings of the Council notice is given of the agenda and subjects to be discussed so that delegations have time to seek the instructions of their governments.

The Council Committees

The Council is assisted by committees, which study questions submitted to them for assessment or recommendation. As in the case of decisions of the Council, committee decisions represent a collective view of the 15 governments based on the instructions those governments have sent to their representatives on the committees. There are committees dealing with: political affairs, economics, armaments, defense review, nuclear defense, science, ecology, infrastructure, communications, civil emergency planning, information and cultural relations and civil and military budgets. Other committees deal with specialized subjects, such as NATO pipelines, European air space, etc.

Since 1966, the problems of nuclear defense policy have been dealt with by the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) (composed of Defense Ministers of all NATO countries except France, Iceland and Luxembourg) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) (seven or eight countries drawn from the membership of the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee). The NPG, which meets regularly at Permanent Representatives' level and twice a year at Defense Minister level, changes its composition periodically so that all interested countries have an opportunity to participate in its work.

For environmental problems the Council established in November 1969, a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, chaired by the Secretary General of NATO or his representative, normally the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs.

The Secretary General

The Secretary General is Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, Defense Planning Committee, Nuclear Affairs Defense Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. He is the head of the International Secretariat with a staff drawn from all member countries.

The Secretary General has the right to propose items for NATO consultation and he is generally responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation. He has the authority to offer his good offices informally at any time in cases of disputes between member countries, and with their consent, to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation or arbitration (for example with Greece and Turkey over Cyprus).

The Deputy Secretary General assists the Secretary General in his function and deputises for him in his absence. Under the Secretary General are four Assistant Secretaries General, each in charge of a division, as follows: Political Affairs, Defense Planning & Policy, Defense Support, and Scientific Affairs. Each Assistant Secretary General is normally chairman of the main committee dealing with his subject.

The Military Committee

The Military Committee, the highest military authority in the alliance, is responsible for making recommendations to the Council and Defense Planning Committee on military matters and for supplying guidance on military questions to allied commanders and subirdinate military authorities. It is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of all member countries, except France and Iceland (which has no military forces). The Chiefs of Staff meet at least twice a year—and whenever else it may be found necessary. However, to enable the Military Committee to function in permanent session with effective powers of decision, each Chief of Staff appoints a Permanent Military Representative. Between meetings of the Chiefs of Staff, their Permanent Military Representatives deal with and settle questions which come within the province of the Military Committee, except those which, by their nature and scope, require the approval of the Chiefs of Staff. Liaison between the Military Committee and the French High Command is effected through the Chief of the French Military Mission to the Military Committee.

Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA
Supreme Allied Commander Europe

The Presidency of the Military Committee rotates annually in the alphabetical order of countries. The chairmanship is held by a permanent chairman, elected by the committee for a period of two to three years. There is a Deputy Chairman who is also specifically responsible for the coordination of nuclear matters within the International Military Staff.

The Military Committee is represented on the North Atlantic Council and has a number of NATO military agencies under its authority.

The International Military Staff

The Military Committee is assisted by an integrated International Military Staff (IMS) which is headed by a Director, selected from any of the member nations. The Director is assisted by six Assistant Directors of general officer rank, and the Secretary of the IMS. The Assistant Directors head the Divisions for Intelligence; Plans and Policy; Organization, Exercises & Operations; Logistics; Communications and Electronics; and Command, Control and Information Systems. As the executive agency of the Military Committee, the IMS is charged with ensuring that the policies and de-

NAVAL FORCE—A U.S. Navy midshipman and Canadian Navy Lt. Andrew Chant work together on the bridge of the Canadian Navy Destroyer Escort Saguenay. The ship is part of the NATO Standby Naval Force Atlantic.

U.S. Navy Photo

cisions of the Military Committee are implemented as directed. In addition, the IMS prepares plans, initiates studies and recommends policy on matters of a military nature.

The NATO Commands

The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is divided, taking account of geographical and political factors, among three commands: the Atlantic Ocean Command, the European Command and the Channel Command. (Defense plans for the North American area are developed by the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group). The authority exercised by these commands varies in form, being affected by the geographical and political factors and by the situation under peace or war conditions.

Most forces of member countries remain under national command in peacetime; some of them may either be assigned or earmarked to NATO commands.

The NATO commanders are responsible for the development of defense plans for their respective areas, for the determination of force requirements and for the deployment and exercise of the force under their command.

The organization of these commands is flexible enough and the liaison between them close enough to allow for mutual support in the event of war, and the rapid shifting of the necessary land, sea and air forces to meet any situation likely to confront the North Atlantic Community.

The European Command

Allied Command Europe (ACE) covers the area extending from the North Cape to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey, excluding the United Kingdom and Portugal, the defense of which does not fall under any one major NATO command. ACE is subdivided into a number of subordinate commands.

The European area is under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), whose headquarters, near Mons, Belgium, is known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).

The SACEUR has also under his orders the ACE Mobile Force. This force is composed of both land and air units supplied by different member countries. It can be ready for action at very short notice in any threatened area and in particular on the northern and southern flanks of the European Command.

In peacetime, SACEUR's main functions are to prepare and finalize defense plans for the area under his command, and ensure the combat efficiency of forces assigned to him in the event of war. SACEUR also makes recommendations to the Military Committee on matters likely to improve the organization of his command.

He would, in time of war, control all land, sea and air operations in this area. Internal defense (including that of Sardinia and Sicily) and defense of coastal waters remain the responsibility of the national authorities concerned, but the Supreme Commander would have full authority to carry out such operations as he considered necessary for the defense of any part of the area under his command.

Thirteen of the North Atlantic countires maintain a National Military Representative (NMR) at SHAPE, providing military liaison with the Allied Chiefs of Staff. France has a military liaison mission at SHAPE.

SACEUR and his Deputy Supreme Allied Commander are assisted by political and scientific advisers in addition to the usual military staff advisers.

The Atlantic Ocean Command

This command extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa, except for the English Channel and the British Isles. The Atlantic Ocean Command is subdivided into a number of subordinate comands.

The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) also has under his orders the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). This force is composed of an international

NATO Photo

SMALLPOX—A Turkish Air Force medical officer vaccinates a Turkish NADGE site worker against smallpox.

U.S. Army Photo

A German M-60 tank moves with the "Orange Force" during NATO maneuvers near Kitsingen, West Germany.

squadron of ships from NATO countries normally operating in the Atlantic.

The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, like the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, receives his directions from the Military Committee.

SACLANT's peacetime responsibilities consist of preparing and finalizing defense plans, conducting joint training exercises, laying down training standards and supplying the NATO authorities with information on his strategic requirements.

Acknowledgement

Materials used in this issue of *Commander's Digest* were furnished by the Office of Information, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, and the U.S. Department of State.

The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic is to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an enemy. SACLANT has responsibility for islands in this area, such as Iceland and the Azores.

SACLANT's responsibilities are almost entirely operational. STANAVFORLANT is permanently attached to his command in peacetime. In addition, for training purposes and in the event of war, forces earmarked by the nations involved are assigned to his direction. Although these forces are predominantly naval, they also include ground forces and land-based air forces.

The Channel Command

The Channel Command covers the English Channel and the southern areas of the North Sea. Its mission is to control and protect merchant shipping in the area, cooperating with SACEUR in the air defense of the channel. In emergency the forces earmarked to the command are predominantly naval but include maritime air forces. The Allied Commander in Chief Channel (CINCHAN) has a Maritime Air Adviser who is also the Commander Allied Maritime Air Force Channel.

The Channel Committee consists of the Naval Chiefs of Staff of Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and acts as an advisory body to the Allied Commander in Chief.

Regional Planning Group

The Canada-United States Planning Group, which covers the North American area, develops and recommends to the Military Committee plans for the defense of the Canada-United States region. It meets alternately in Washington and Ottawa.

Policy

Western Europe Essential to U.S. Security

U.S. Policy: A friendly, prosperous, and stable Western Europe is indispensable to fundamental U.S. national security. Two world wars have made this fact clear. Five Presidents have concluded that U.S. security requires the presences in Europe of substantial U.S. military forces, complementing the forces of our allies.

In light of the current security situation in Europe, NATO's military forces, including U.S. NATO-committed forces in Europe, can be reduced only if accompanied by reciprocal Warsaw Pact reductions. At the present time, the military facts provide no justification for a unilateral reduction of American forces in the European area.

The Military Situation

The U.S.S.R. and its allies are continuing to increase their military capabilities in Europe. The Warsaw Pact forces maintain some 2.8 million men under arms. The most ready of these forces are massed in the central region of Europe with a ground force of some 45-50 highly mobile and heavily armored divisions. The Soviet Union contributes about 31 divisions of this number, of which some 20 armored and mechanized infantry divisions are stationed in East Germany alone.

NATO, in response to these powerful Warsaw Pact military capabilities, is improving its defense. Our allies maintain about 3 million men under arms. Turkey and France have about 500,000 each; the Federal Republic of Germany has more than 460,000; and Italy slightly more than 400,000. In addition, several allies (Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands) station about 150,000 land and air forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The U.S. share of this defense force totals about 300,000 military personnel in the European area, as follows: Army 190,000; Air Force 70,000; the Navy and Marines 40,000 including the 6th Fleet. The bulk of the U.S. air and land forces (about 215,000) are in the Federal Republic of Germany, an area which is the key to the defense of Western Europe. Most U.S. naval forces are in the Mediterranean area.

NATO Strategy

The plans of NATO are based on flexible response and forward defense. Flexible response means that NATO must be prepared to respond to a wide range of Warsaw Pact challenges—from threats to use of force, to limited aggression, to all-out nuclear attack. Forward defense means defense mounted as far forward as possible to provide maximum protection of NATO territory.

NATO conventional forces in this age of rough nuclear parity assume a more important role in defending NATO territory as far forward as possible. This vital function cannot be performed if these conventional forces are reduced by U.S. withdrawals in the absence of comparable Soviet reductions. The idea of nuclear weapons alone as an inexpensive panacea for the defense of Europe is an illusion. This NATO strategy, made credible by maintaining adequate NATO forces in being, has enabled the alliance to successfully deter aggression against NATO for more than 20 years.

Consequences Of U.S. Withdrawal

A significant unilateral reduction in the U.S. military presence would, among other things:

- Weaken significantly NATO's conventional defense and create the impression the U.S. does not believe in the need for a high level of conventional forces. Other NATO members might be tempted to follow suit with additional reductions. In the event of aggression, a weakened NATO alliance might be forced to resort more quickly to nuclear weapons.
- Weaken our bargaining position in efforts to improve East-West relations, particularly in seeking mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe;
- Undermine the credibility of our commitment to the defense of Western Europe, thereby encouraging Warsaw Pact nations to take more risks;
- Increase European fears that we might disregard allied interests in order to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. This is of particular concern when Phase II of the strategic arms limitation talks are under way between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

NATO Costs

The operating cost of U.S. forces stationed in the European area is about $4 billion annually. Withdrawing U.S. combat units to be maintained in the U.S. under NATO command for return to Europe in a crisis would not necessarily reduce these costs. For example, much of the equipment in Europe would have to be duplicated in the U.S.

Our allies spend about $35 billion annually on defense, practically all of it to defend the NATO area. During Fiscal Years 72-73, the Federal Republic of Germany, in keeping with its December 1971 agreement to help offset our balance-of-payments deficit, was to spend some $2 billion in the procurement of U.S. weapons and equipment, on investment in U.S. Treasury securities, and to improve U.S. military facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany. A new agreement for FY 74 and FY 75 is currently under negotiations. The Eurogroup Defense Ministers, representing 10 allied nations, have launched a special $1 billion European Defense Improvement Program, and have increased their defense budgets.

Source: Department of State GIST, "Europe: U.S. Forces," January 1973. Department of State Pamphlet, "Why we maintain U.S. Forces in Europe," July 1973.

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The Military Situation

The U.S.S.R. and its allies are continuing to increase their military capabilities in Europe. The Warsaw Pact forces maintain some 2.8 million men under arms. The most ready of these forces are massed in the central region of Europe with a ground force of some 45-50 highly mobile and heavily armored divisions. The Soviet Union contributes about 31 divisions of this number, of which some 20 armored and mechanized infantry divisions are stationed in East Germany alone.

NATO, in response to these powerful Warsaw Pact military capabilities, is improving its defense. Our allies maintain about 3 million men under arms. Turkey and France have about 500,000 each; the Federal Republic of Germany has more than 460,000; and Italy slightly more than 400,000. In addition, several allies (Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands) station about 150,000 land and air forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The U.S. share of this defense force totals about 300,000 military personnel in the European area, as follows: Army 190,000; Air Force 70,000; the Navy and Marines 40,000 including the 6th Fleet. The bulk of the U.S. air and land forces (about 215,000) are in the Federal Republic of Germany, an area which is the key to the defense of Western Europe. Most U.S. naval forces are in the Mediterranean area.

NATO Strategy

The plans of NATO are based on flexible response and forward defense. Flexible response means that NATO must be prepared to respond to a wide range of Warsaw Pact challenges—from threats to use of force, to limited aggression, to all-out nuclear attack. Forward defense means defense mounted as far forward as possible to provide maximum protection of NATO territory.

NATO conventional forces in this age of rough nuclear parity assume a more important role in defending NATO territory as far forward as possible. This vital function cannot be performed if these conventional forces are reduced by U.S. withdrawals in the absence of comparable Soviet reductions. The idea of nuclear weapons alone as an inexpensive panacea for the defense of Europe is an illusion. This NATO strategy, made credible by maintaining adequate NATO forces in being, has enabled the alliance to successfully deter aggression against NATO for more than 20 years.

Consequences Of U.S. Withdrawal

A significant unilateral reduction in the U.S. military presence would, among other things:

- Weaken significantly NATO's conventional defense and create the impression the U.S. does not believe in the need for a high level of conventional forces. Other NATO members might be tempted to follow suit with additional reductions. In the event of aggression, a weakened NATO alliance might be forced to resort more quickly to nuclear weapons.
- Weaken our bargaining position in efforts to improve East-West relations, particularly in seeking mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe;
- Undermine the credibility of our commitment to the defense of Western Europe, thereby encouraging Warsaw Pact nations to take more risks;
- Increase European fears that we might disregard allied interests in order to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. This is of particular concern when Phase II of the strategic arms limitation talks are under way between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

NATO Costs

The operating cost of U.S. forces stationed in the European area is about $4 billion annually. Withdrawing U.S. combat units to be maintained in the U.S. under NATO command for return to Europe in a crisis would not necessarily reduce these costs. For example, much of the equipment in Europe would have to be duplicated in the U.S.

Our allies spend about $35 billion annually on defense, practically all of it to defend the NATO area. During Fiscal Years 72-73, the Federal Republic of Germany, in keeping with its December 1971 agreement to help offset our balance-of-payments deficit, was to spend some $2 billion in the procurement of U.S. weapons and equipment, on investment in U.S. Treasury securities, and to improve U.S. military facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany. A new agreement for FY 74 and FY 75 is currently under negotiations. The Eurogroup Defense Ministers, representing 10 allied nations, have launched a special $1 billion European Defense Improvement Program, and have increased their defense budgets.

Source: Department of State GIST, "Europe: U.S. Forces," January 1973. Department of State Pamphlet, "Why we maintain U.S. Forces in Europe," July 1973.

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